H5N1

D: “It’s alright. We ran tests on those samples and isolated the SZ77 A3231 virus.”

I: “What is this SZ77 A3231 virus?”

D: “This is a strain of the Ebola virus.”

I: “Would you like to comment about it?”

D: “It’s rather impossible to totally explain it.”

I: “I can understand so, but why is the term “less-infectious” always affixed to our version of the Ebola virus?”

D: “There are 2 reasons for doing so. First, to reduce panic among the people should it ever leak. And second, the Ebola virus has evolved in China. Re-combination has been detected. Most prominently at the portion which determines its effect on humans (very technical description, I can’t describe it. sorry.). Also, abrupt breaks in the sequencing were detected, leading to changes in the incubation period. (Or possibly “changes in the incubation period were detected”)

I: “How were these viruses classified then? / Could you elaborate more about the various strains?”

D: “Previously, strains of Ebola in China always had the EBO prefix. Subsequently following information leaks, the classification method was changed. We stopped using the EBO prefix. Instead, coupled with the discovery that the virus had become more virulent and lethal, we re-named the strains according to the placed where they were first discovered. For example, the strain in June became the SZ77 A3231. Sometimes, we don’t even use their place of discovery, instead directly naming it the A3231.”

I: “In that way, the Ebola virus wouldn’t even be brought into the picture.”

D: “Precisely, viruses such as the Ebola are national secrets.”

Dr. Henry Niman interprets the translation of the above conversation with a doctor involved in testing samples from patients in the mysterious swine disease outbreak in Sichuan Province:

The interview also indicates that the Streptococcus Suis is not the cause of the illness. It is present in pigs and is merely activated by infectious agents, which include Ebola, plague, and an un-named virus which is considered “dangerous”. The emphasis is on the bacteria because it can produce similar symptoms. The symptoms of the patients match pandemic flu of 1918, and H5N1 can produce such symptoms.

In other words, the official party line, which is that the 34 dead in Sichuan Province (out of 46 outcomes–a whopping case fatality rate of 72%) succumbed to streptococcus infections, is a pile of pig poop.

It looks like a new strain of Ebola, possibly recombined with H5N1 (avian flu). Until the Chinese government allows the outside world to take a look, we won’t know for sure.

Will the nations with the most to lose economically gamble on the altruistic (read: economic self-preservation) move to put out the small fires in Indonesia, Viet Nam and Thailand by sending their supplies of antivirals and vaccines there to possibly contain the spread? A recent Washington Post article points out that...

"... unless antiviral drugs squelch a pandemic at the outset, their ultimate usefulness will be small. ... In theory, even a modest amount of vaccine might be useful. Fighting disease outbreaks is like fighting fires. You do not have to hose down the whole world to put the fire out, but you do have to hose down the perimeter to keep it from spreading. It might be possible to contain an H5N1 outbreak at its source if the surrounding population were immediately vaccinated.

Would the United States, Europe and Japan be willing to donate their precious vaccine supply to mount this long-shot defense? This is perhaps the biggest unanswered question in pandemic flu planning -- and one likely to be answered only at the moment of truth.

Officially, it is a possibility.

If it was done in consultation with the World Health Organization -- and with other governments that would make contributions, as well -- we would be more likely to consider it," said Gellin at HHS. But observers both in and out of the government said, not for quotation, that they doubt the U.S. government would ever send a significant amount of its vaccine stockpile overseas.
 

Even if this scenario played out and we gave up our stockpiles to put out small fires overseas, there remains the wildcard of spread over vast distance by bird migration (or infected airline passengers) starting too many small fires to handle; and the barrier of secrecy and disinformation across the vast Chinese borders where a significant brush fire may already be spreading.

We (global mankind, science and public health) have not adequately anticipated and prepared for such a scenario, even though we could have seen it coming for a decade or more. If we could turn back time 15 years and know with certainty the pathogens we would face in the future, would there have been any better cooperation between continents? Would we have wasted so much talent, wealth and technology (ostensibly) to protect our people and way of life from acts of terrorism if we'd accepted that it was emerging infectious disease that posed by far the greater threat to our economy and to our very survival?

It seems we may be very near the moment of truth. Is it too late to turn our swords into vaccines?  

Posted by dymaxion at August 2, 2005 05:50 PM

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